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When economic agents care for some extra-economic issue a great deal, there is a
polarisation on the subject and this is not coincident with the division of society on the
fiscal policy measures the authority should implement, a coalition government with
conflicting fiscal purposes is likely to be elected in office. This "ideological" coalition is
most likely to cause the accumulation of large public debts, because its members find it
impossible to choose a fiscal policy co-operatively. Their strategic interaction leads to
delays in stabilisation which are shown to constitute a welfare loss. A necessary
condition for all this to happen is a precise institutional set-up, i.e. a parliamentary
democracy with proportional representation. A change of the institutional context may
be the right cure to follow.
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1. Introduction.
Some OECD economies have accumulated large public debts in the last twenty years
(Italy, Belgium and Ireland are among them), while others haven't. The economists
who have tried to explain this cross-country difference in fiscal policies have focused
on politico-institutional determinants, finding it unconvincing to justify it using just
economic arguments such as country-specific shocks or different perceptions of the
length of shocks. Since the experience of large budget deficits for several years is
typical of just some countries, the explanation must be some country-specific factor;
but what is more country-specific than political institutions and context? This line of
research has therefore come to be part of that recent branch of literature known as
Political Economy which has developed out of the credibility literature
1.
Some empirical works published in the late Eighties and early Nineties (Roubini and
Sachs (1989a, 1989b), Grilli et al. (1991)) pointed out that the political factor playing
a role in determining the accumulation of large public debts might be a high degree of
fractionalisation of governments. Since both Italy and Belgium had a long tradition of
coalition governments, economists started thinking that running large budget deficits
might be the consequence of the difficulty that a coalition government finds in taking
decisions because of its divided nature.
The idea by which the degree of government fractionalisation and growth of public
debt are related has since then become rather popular, also because the empirical
evidence seems to give some credit to it. This paper aims at putting this thesis into a
rigorous theoretical framework. To our knowledge, in fact, the only attempt so far to
build a model on the subject is to be found in Alesina and Drazen (1991). However, in
Alesina and Drazen's model some basic issues are dealt with in what we think is an
unconvincing way. Besides, no-one has addressed so far the question why conflicting
coalition governments come into being. A favourable institutional context
(parliamentary democracies with proportional representation) is a necessary but not
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sufficient condition. Our answer is that a strong  polarisation of the electoral body on
some extra-economic issue can play a major role. Our model may then also be read as
an investigation into the relation between "ideological" polarisation and fiscal policy.
The main reason why the model by Alesina and Drazen needs in our view a
reconsideration has to do with the fact that it does not seem to capture the real nature
of the strategic interaction between coalition partners. To see the point, let us briefly
describe that model. The economy is made up by two agents; there is a polarisation on
an economic subject, namely the distribution of the costs of a public good to be
produced in a given amount. The institutional context is such that it allows agents to
form a coalition and rule together as an alternative to alternating in office, and a
coalition is assumed to be in power. Both agents would like the coalition partner to
pay for the larger amount of public spending, so no decision can be taken about the
amount of tax revenues to be raised from each of them. The use of debt and seignorage
to cover the budget deficit is a consequence of this. But inflation is distortionary, and
each coalition partner suffers from it with an intensity that is not known by his partner.
This makes it possible to identify the strategic interaction between the coalition
partners with an imperfect and incomplete information game that is well-known in
game theory: the War of Attrition. Delays in stabilisation happen because only time can
work as a revelation mechanism here. At each point in time both players make
declarations about their sensitivity to the distortions caused by inflation equivalent to
declare to be either ready or not to be burdened with the greater part of the fiscal
deficit from then onwards. There is an incentive to be a free rider at first, but since
delaying the stabilisation is costly, this incentive becomes smaller and smaller, till the
player with the higher sensitivity to the distortions associated to the use of seignorage
"concedes".
Clearly, the assumption about the players' information set plays a crucial role in the
model: if the coalition partners had complete information there would not be any delay
in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes to finance public spending. Yet this feature,
which is specific to the War of Attrition game, does not seem to catch what really goes
on in coalition governments. It is unlikely that the partners of a coalition do not know
each other's payoffs, and anyway, their strategic interaction has more to do with their
inability to create binding commitments between each other, as pointed out in Roubini
and Sachs (1989a). This may be due to the fact that the procedure to generate a3
financial bill entails noncontemporaneous votes, making vote-trading easy to renege
on.
A second unpleasant aspect of the War of Attrition model is its sketchy presentation of
the political context. In our opinion, it is important to define the terms of the question
in a more detailed way. This is relevant not just to understand why coalition
governments with conflicting fiscal purposes are formed, as mentioned earlier, but also
for the better definition of the theses to test empirically. For instance, it is not correct
to try to find a relation between the type of democracy of a country and its fiscal
performance, as not all parliamentary democracies with proportional representation
have a story of coalition governments. One should  differentiate among them according
to their degree of ideological polarisation.
Identifying the true determinant of the accumulation of large public debts with the
presence of a polarisation on some extra-economic matter (where there exists already a
polarisation on fiscal policy and the division of the electorate on the subject is different
from the ideological one) instead of with the presence of a coalition government has
also another advantage. It reminds the fact that not all coalition governments are debt-
and inflation-prone, but only those formed by parties with conflicting views on fiscal
policy. Too often has this been forgotten in the works on the subject so far published,
but it is clearly a gross mistake to put together Mr Kohl's coalition governments with
most of the Belgian or Italian ones.
2. Assumptions: the economic context.
There are two social groups: workers and rentiers. Workers only earn from their
labour, rentiers from the rent of their land. Per capita income is exogenously given,
constant and corresponds to the actual income each individual earns.
There is a public good to be produced, the optimal amount of which, g, is constant
and exogenously given. There are two non distortionary taxes available: a lump sum to
be paid by workers and a lump sum on land. The polarisation on the subject of the
allocation of the fiscal burden is extreme: if rentiers were in power, they would set the
tax on land to 0 and charge workers with the whole of it, while if workers were in
charge they would do the opposite.4
It is also possible to run budget deficits and to issue public debt to cover them. Public
debt is sold abroad and therefore pays an exogenously given world interest rate, r, to
the holder; for simplicity, however, we will set r to 0. We are in a discrete time set-up:
the life of public debt bonds is one year, and on the first day of each year, the day the
government presents their financial bill, it can either be renewed or paid back. At the
beginning of the game (T=0
2) public debt is equal to 0.
Since there is a ceiling to the debt which can be issued, public spending cannot be
financed through public debt only; a part of it must be financed by raising taxes
3 from
agents.
When the elections' results have not given an answer to the question about who should
carry the fiscal burden (meaning there is a coalition in office comprising representatives
of both social groups) neither of the lump sum taxes can be used singularly, because it
is not politically feasible. Nor can the government use both. In fact, coalition parties
cannot co-operate on how to have the social groups they represent share the cost of
public expenditure. We will see that the reason for this is that the institutional context
is such that their commitments are not credible.
A viable option in this case is the use of public debt matched by seignorage, because
the latter is a tax affecting everyone's utility in the same way. Inflation is however
distortionary. This is essential to qualify the equilibria of the game we will analyse as
sub-optimal. It is assumed that the budget deficit is financed through seignorage and
public debt in fixed proportions: g  and 1-g
4.
There exist two types of agents. For a first group, ideology has absolute priority over
consumption in their utility: their preferences are lexicographic with ideology at the top
of the ranking. If a government with a different ideological tendency is in power, their
utility is the lowest possible, no matter the fiscal policy implemented. In contrast, for
the second group ideology enters the utility function just like any other argument. We
will call these agents "unattached voters". Neither ultra-ideological nor unattached
voters identify with just one of the social groups above.
The utility function of an unattached voter is the following:
                                                       
2 T is the first day of the t+1 year.
3 This is an assumption borrowed from the original model by Alesina and Drazen. It is essential for
the war of attrition, and for the game in our model, too.
4 g  may be thought of as the ceiling to the monetisation of budget deficits imposed by the law.5
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b  is the rate of discount, but for simplicity we will set it to 0;
c is consumption of private goods
5;
y is yearly per capita income, and by subtracting it we are just normalising;
K represents the utility loss due to the presence of seignorage, and is a linear function
of the level of inflation:
Kt t ( ) q qp =
q  is a parameter measuring how sensitive utility is to the distortions caused by
inflation. Inflation has two effects on utility: a real balance effect and an indirect effect
via the distortions it causes. Both are the same for everyone.
The last term accounts for ideological preferences: d  is a dummy equal to 1 if a
conservative government is in office and to 0 otherwise; q measures the bias for the
conservative ideology
6. q is the same for all agents and can take up values from -¥ to
+¥. It is a random variable which is assumed to move over time as a random walk:
q q t t t = + -1 e e            W.N. t
By modelling q this way we emphasise a strong serial autocorrelation of the
ideological tendencies of a given national context, but also their dependence on
"cultural shocks". Agents tend to be ideologically coherent, but new information may
make them change their mind.
                                                       
5 Utility is also dependent on the consumption of the public good, but since the level for g is given it
plays no role in the game and is therefore omitted.
6 "Conservative" and "left-wing" are used to define the two opposite ends of the ideological
polarisation (i.e. pro and against abortion, North and South).6
As for ultra-ideological voters, they, too, care for consumption, but only once their
favourite ideology is represented in power. The dependence of their utility on non-
ideological factors is modelled in the same way as for unattached voters:
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Since all agents' utility is linear in consumption, all consumption paths satisfying the
budget constraint with equality give the same (maximum) utility. One of those paths is
the following: at every time every agent consumes all disposable income. We assume
then that this is the path our economy chooses, so this a world with no saving
7.
There is a maximum length of time during which public spending can be financed by
recurring to debt. We assume that from T=2 on such a practice is forbidden. This may
be seen as the requirement imposed by an international agreement our economy has
signed up for. If a coalition party is still in office at that or a later date, they will have
to make both social groups pay for half of the fiscal burden. This assumption makes it
possible to describe the interaction between the coalition parties before the
international agreement is enforced as a game like the one in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) called the Bank Runs game
8. What is necessary for this is a time the game will
end at, while what happens afterwards if a coalition with conflicting fiscal purposes is
still in charge may be specified in different ways. We have chosen the random draw
just mentioned for simplicity.
3. Assumptions: the political context.
                                                       
7 This obviously means that the Ricardian Equivalence does not hold here. However, public debt is
still neutral in itself, because different intertemporal allocations of any given amount of consumption
give the same utility. This is due to the special form the utility function takes: it is linear in
consumption and characterised by intertemporal additivity. It is only when inflation is introduced
alongside with debt that there is a reduction in welfare.
8 This assumption plays the same role as the one about the incomplete information of players in
Alesina and Drazen: its presence is functional to the identification of coalition partners' interaction
with a game the features of which have already been investigated.7
The setting is a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation. Elections
take place every second year, precisely at T=0 and T=2. The winner must immediately
produce a financial bill.
The number of voters, the same as the number of agents of the economy for simplicity,
is N=2n+a, n of which are rentiers and n+a of which are workers (a is an odd number).
If there were no ideological biases only two parties would compete at the elections:
one would finance public spending through a lump sum to be paid by workers only and
the other through a lump sum imposed on rentiers. The latter would always win, since
workers are more numerous than rentiers.
However, this is not the case. Ideology matters, and if the political scenario is affected
by this factor in certain ways it is possible to have no absolute majority as a result of
political elections, and the formation, as a consequence, of a coalition government
(possibly comprising representatives of both rentiers and workers, and thus having
conflicting fiscal proposals in itself).
We must then specify a way in which a political context is conditioned by ideological
polarisation so that all this may happen. A restricted and not too unrealistic set of
assumptions that satisfies this need is the following
9:
1) the number of voters with lexicographic preferences is equal or greater than the
majority plus one of the electoral body ((2n+a+1)/2). Note that these are both workers
and rentiers;
2) there exists an ideological division between voters with lexicographic preferences
not corresponding to the social distinction workers/rentiers. That is, there are both
conservative and left-wing workers, while rentiers may be all conservative or some
conservative and some left-wing. There are therefore three (four) "ideological
constituencies": one is ideologically left-wing and has a preference for the adoption of
a lump sum tax to be paid by rentiers; one is conservative but shares the same fiscal
goals as the first one; one is conservative and prefers imposing a lump sum on workers
(the last, eventual one has the same preferences as the third one as far as fiscal policy is
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concerned, but it is left-wing by ideology)
10. The votes of agents with lexicographic
preferences are not swinging: they stick to the political party that gives voice to the
ideological constituency they belong to;
3) no ideological constituency (IC) gets the majority of votes. In addition, the
following inequalities hold:
(IC of left-wing rentiers) < IC of conservative rentiers
IC of conservative rentiers < IC of conservative workers
11
IC of conservative workers < IC of left-wing workers
4) the number of unattached workers is equal or smaller than the size of the IC of left-
wing workers; it is also greater than the number of unattached rentiers;
5) all voters are rational and forward-looking, and they have full information.
If these assumptions are met, those with lexicographic preferences may only vote for
someone who is part of their own IC, because this is the only way they can be sure that
in case the elections will have no absolute majority as a result, those they have voted
for will set up alliances/coalitions giving priority to ideology. Since their votes are only
cast for candidates who are ultra-ideological themselves, the following three (four)
parties must exist:
- A1: all members are part of the IC of conservative rentiers;
- A2: all members are part of the IC of conservative workers;
- (B1: all members are part of the IC of left-wing rentiers);
- B2: all members are part of the IC of left-wing workers.
                                                       
10 The characterisation of ideological constituencies by a preference regarding fiscal policy (which is
the reason why there are three/four) is not in contrast to the very definition of such groups. In fact, the
utility of agents with lexicographic preferences does depend on consumption, although on ideology
first.
11 This condition must be met if a > n; if n > a the IC of conservative rentiers must be greater than the
IC of conservative workers.9
A/B stands for conservative/left-wing; 1/2 stands for rentiers/workers and
correspondingly to the preference on the fiscal policy to implement (1= lump sum on
workers, 2= lump sum on rentiers).
Are there likely to be other parties competing in the elections? There may be, as
unattached voters may have their own candidates. However, it can be shown that this
is not relevant to our model: given these assumptions, considering any richer political
scenario is the same as considering just the three (four) parties above. We will then
stick to the simpler set-up and say that the only candidates are those of A1, A2, B2
(B1), and that therefore also unattached voters must cast their vote for either of
them
12.
4. The game and its political context: an overview.
We will proceed as follows. First, we take for granted that the elections at T=0 gave
no absolute majority to any party, and that through a coalition A1 and A2 form a
government with sufficient parliamentary support. We will therefore consider what
fiscal policy will be implemented. As A1 and A2 have conflicting fiscal goals, and the
institutional context is such that they cannot co-operate, such a policy is the product of
their strategic interaction. We will then describe the game played between the coalition
members. We will make clear how the value for q  is crucial in determining which
equilibrium will be reached. If it is one by which the government may finance public
spending by using public debt, inefficiency is introduced in the economy, as debt is
matched by seignorage, which is distortionary.
As a second step, we will consider the electoral background to all this. We will see that
only two electoral results are possible: a victory for B2 or no absolute majority, after
which A1 and A2 form a coalition government. It all depends on the ideological bias of
unattached workers, which may be as strong as to have them not vote for B2, in spite
of the fact that by voting for A2 their favourite fiscal policy will not be implemented,
and they will suffer, like any other agent in the economy, from the inefficiency
introduced by the coalition.
                                                       
12 The very presence of agents with lexicographic preferences is functional to this simplification of the
political scenario, as well as to the requirement that in case of no absolute majority the coalition that
will be formed will be based on ideological affinities (which is what it takes to have coalitions with
conflicting fiscal purposes).10
Considering the electoral background means setting the conditions for having A1+A2
in power, instead of taking the circumstance for granted. These conditions are about
the ideological bias of unattached workers. When the majority of unattached voters
(that is what unattached workers are) are strongly "conservative", an economy finds it
convenient to bear the economic costs of having a certain ideological view represented
in power, because the benefits in terms of utility that this implies are greater than those
costs.
5. The game between the coalition partners.
The game is one of complete but imperfect information (simultaneous moves), where a
second stage is reached only if there was a certain outcome at stage one (see Diamond
and Dybvig (1983)).
The very moment of their election (T=0) a government must take a decision about the
allocation of the fiscal burden and produce a financial bill. If the government is an
ideological coalition the process through which such a decision is taken is peculiar. A1
and A2, the coalition partners, must simultaneously choose an action: whether to
concede, that is, declaring oneself ready to be burdened with the whole of the fiscal
deficit for the rest of the mandate, or whether not to concede. If both parties concede,
a coin is tossed at T=0 to choose between raising a lump sum tax from rentiers and
raising a lump sum tax from workers in both years of the term. If only one concedes,
the social group it represents will be the one financing public spending for the whole
length of the mandate. Finally, if both parties do not concede, neither lump sum tax can
be used, and public spending at t=1 (the first year of the mandate) is financed through
debt and inflation. At T=1 debt must be either repaid or renewed, hence a new stage of
the game takes place, with both players having to declare again "concession" or "no
concession".
Unlike in Alesina Drazen (1991), the actions are not statements about the players'
nature: we are in a context of complete information. Rather, no concession is
something like reneging one's word (by proposing amendments to the financial bill in
Parliament, for instance). The co-operative solution by which both coalition partners
concede is never reachable, since because of the existence of the option not to concede
commitments are not binding, and therefore not credible.11
To write down the game in normal form and find its equilibrium we need to know both
players' payoffs associated with the various outcomes. First of all, let us consider how
debt and inflation evolve if neither player concedes at any time:
b g 1 1 = - ( ) g
p g 1 = g
[ ] b g 2 1 1 1 = - - + ( ) ( ) g g
[ ] p g g 2 1 1 = - + ( ) g
Note that as far as the real balance effect of seignorage is concerned, the incidence at






(the superscript "d" stands for distortionary). Correspondingly, the incidence of a lump
sum tax (t
nd) on rentiers is equal to its revenue divided by n, and the incidence of a
lump sum tax to be paid by workers is equal to its revenue divided by n+a.
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where the superscript "bc" means "before anyone plays concession", "w" means
"winner" (the one who has not conceded in an outcome with unilateral concession), "l"12
stands for loser (the one who has played concession in an outcome with unilateral
concession) and "bil" for bilateral concession, associated with both social groups
having to pay for half of the fiscal burden.
Let us then turn to utility. By substituting out for consumption and considering the
distortionary effects of inflation, expected utility at time t before anyone has conceded














while the expected utility at a time after someone has conceded is equal to 0 for the
winner and minus the expected tax both for the loser and in case of a bilateral
concession.
Suppose now that, however the game evolves, there is a stabilisation at T=2 by which
all debt is repaid. The effects of the strategic interaction between the coalition parties
cannot stretch out beyond t=3, that is, the first year of the next mandate. Therefore,
while writing down the payoffs of the game we must only consider the utility of the
players at t=1, t=2 and t=3. We cannot neglect t=3 utility, because according to how
the game evolves there will or will not be a transmission of debt from this mandate to
the next. If there is transmission of debt, the stabilisation that must take place will
obviously be stronger, as extra tax revenues must be obtained to pay back the debt to
foreign investors.
Note also that by imposing that at T=2 a stabilisation (with given characteristics) will
take place implies that the next election cannot have any disciplinary role on the
behaviour of A1 and A2. In fact, the next electoral round will only be about ideology.
Given the game structure, the payoffs of the game can be easily evaluated. The normal
form of the game is shown in Table 1. In the next paragraphs we will use short names
for the payoffs in this table:
A(i) is player i's payoff when he is the winner at T=0 (i=1, 2);
B(i) is his payoff  when he is the loser at T=0;
C(i) is his payoff when there is bilateral concession at T=0;13
D(i) is his payoff when he is the winner at T=1;
E(i) is his payoff when he is the loser at T=1;
F(i) is his payoff when there is bilateral concession at T=1;
G(i) is his payoff when there is no concession before T=2.
The players use backward induction. They can anticipate the Nash equilibrium of the
second stage of the game; they insert the corresponding payoffs in the first stage,
where "next stage" is written, and finally choose their strategies. The result is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Notice that "concession, concession" is never an equilibrium. At every stage, if the
opponent concedes, any player will play "no concession", because by so doing he
avoids being fiscally burdened altogether (he will only have to pay his share at T=2, as
required by the international agreement). The comparison between the payoffs
associated with conceding and not conceding, given that the opponent does not
concede, is instead less clear-cut. Both options imply costs in terms of utility, and
whether not conceding is more or less costly depends on how sensitive the players are
to the distortions introduced by seignorage, that is, on the value of the parameter q .
6. An equilibrium implying growth of debt and inflation in both years of the
mandate with certainty.
Let us imagine that at T=1 concession is a dominated strategy, so that "no concession,
no concession" is the unique Nash equilibrium. Let us further imagine that the same
happens at T=0. This is an interesting case, as it implies that the coalition government
makes use of debt and inflation to finance public spending in both years of its office,
thus introducing the maximum amount of inefficiency in the economy.
What values may q  take so that the game unfolds in this way? At T=1 A2's payoff
associated with "no concession", given that A1 does not concede, is greater than the













2 N n a
                          (1)14
If this condition holds, it may be easily be shown that also A1's payoff associated to
"no concession", given that the opponent does not concede, is greater than the one
associated to concession conditional on the same circumstances. In fact, the condition
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which is clearly not so stringent.
The next step is to compare for each player the payoff associated with the NE at T=1,
now seen as the outcome of playing "no concession, no concession" at T=0, with the
payoff associated with conceding at T=0, given that the opponent does not concede,
and to impose that the former is greater than the latter. It is again the inequality
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but if (3) is satisfied, (4) is satisfied, too.
Notice that quite obviously condition (3) is also more stringent than (1), so (3) is the
condition to be met in order for the game between the coalition parties to evolve in the
way we have described. Note also that the RHS of (3) is positive for all possible values
of the parameters. This tells us that condition (3) does not contradict assuming that
inflation affects utility through the distortions it produces (q > 0).
Let us now consider the economic meaning of what is going on here. By playing "no
concession" instead of "concession", given that the opponent plays "no concession",
both players are better off, because the fiscal burden of the two years of the mandate is15
shared. In fact, the amount of it that is transmitted to t=3 by public debt is shared
because the international agreement imposes that, while the rest is paid during the
mandate as the real balance effect of inflation, and that effect is the same for everyone
by assumption. There is also a distortionary effect attached to inflation, but it is small
enough to be offset by the benefit of paying just half, not the whole of the fiscal burden
of the two years of the term (as it would be the case by playing "concession", given the
opponent does not concede).
It may seem that much depends on the fact that the assumption about the end of the
game is a favourable one for both players, in comparison with what happens to them if
they play "concession", given that the opponent plays "no concession". But that is not
the case. In fact, consider a different assumption about the end of the game: one of the
players (say, A2) pays nothing and the other (A1) is burdened with the whole cost of
the stabilisation. Imagine at first that q = 0. Whatever A1 plays, quite obviously A2
does not concede. But what happens to A1? Whatever he does, he will have to pay for
the whole public spending of t=3. But by playing "concession", given that A2 does not
concede, the equilibrium will be such that A1 will have to pay also for the whole of
public spending of year 1 and 2, while by playing "no concession" he will only have to
pay part of that: the repayment of public debt at T=2 and his share of seignorage
during the mandate. In other words, by playing "no concession" A1 benefits from the
fact that using debt and inflation for the whole of the mandate will make A2 pay,
through seignorage, part of what he would pay entirely if he played "concession". Let
us now remove the assumption q = 0. The result still holds if for A1 the costs of
inflation (linked to its distortionary nature) are smaller than the benefits (in terms of
redistribution of the costs of public spending at t=1 and t=2). A range of values for q
may be found that makes this possible.
From what has been said so far some conclusions may be drawn as far as the welfare
analysis is concerned. If the assumptions are such that the game between the coalition
parties has a unique "no concession, no concession" NE, seignorage is used in both
years of the term of office, so that the maximum amount of inefficiency is introduced in
the economy. However, the condition on the value for q  that is necessary for the game16
to be played this way implies that the welfare loss is not so great, because agents are
not very sensitive to the distortions caused by inflation
13.
Note finally that in this context the strategic interaction between coalition partners
implies rising public debt and inflation during the whole mandate with certainty. In
fact, at both stages "no concession, no concession" is the only equilibrium, and it is in
pure strategies. At T=0 debt and inflation are set greater than 0 (their initial values) to
finance the public spending of the first year of the term; at T=1 public debt rises again
so as to renew the old debt and to finance part of g2; the rest is again raised as
seignorage, which grows in turn.
7. An equilibrium likely to determine growth of debt and inflation in one or both
years of the mandate.
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This implies E(1) > G(1), but also E(2) > G(2), as (1) is more stringent than (2) and
consequently if (2) does not hold, (1) does not hold, either. This means that now both
players find it convenient to concede at T=1, given that the opponent plays "no
concession". At the second stage of the game there are therefore two Nash equilibria:
{D(1), E(2)} and {E(1), D(2)}.
As it is usual in case of multiple equilibria, the question arises of what criterion to use
to single out the most plausible one. Some authors have suggested symmetry is a
reasonable choice rule: an asymmetric equilibrium is in fact an improbable "focal
point"
14. The two equilibria we have identified are extremely asymmetric: in fact, there
is a player who is bound to be the loser (A2 in the first equilibrium, A1 in the second)
and a player who is bound to be the winner, and the payoffs are extremely different.
                                                       
13 Alesina and Drazen (1991) identify some historical examples of prolonged delays in stabilisation
that in their view would not have had an end but for the event of a constitutional reform, because for
both players the marginal cost of inflation was negative. We attempt here to model those situations by
incorporating the expectations of a reform in the payoffs of the players.
14 See Rasmusen (1989).17
Both equilibria are in pure strategies, and in any game with two equilibria in pure
strategies there is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Clearly the mixed strategies
equilibrium is characterised by a smaller degree of asymmetry, as both players play
"concession" and "no concession" with some probability. We are therefore interested in
identifying the mixed strategies equilibrium of the game, because it is a likely "focal
point". We can then single it out and insert the associated payoffs into the first stage of
the game, thus presumably following the players' backward induction.
In the mixed strategies equilibrium at T=1 let us call p the probability with which A1





































Note that if a = 0, p and b  would be equal, and consequently the mixed strategies
equilibrium would be perfectly symmetric; instead here p b > , and we can only talk of
a smaller degree of asymmetry with respect to the pure strategies equilibria.
Let us call MIX A 1 1 and MIX A 1 2 the expected payoffs (of A1 and A2 respectively)
associated with these strategies. Their values are the following:
[ ]
MIX A a an n a an n a n an n
a a n an a n an n g
n n a a an n
1 1 2 8 8 4 10 4 6 24 24
4 8 4 16 16
2 2 2 4
2 2 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2
2 1
= - - - + + + - - - +
- + + - - -
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[ ]
MIX A a an n a an n a a n an
n a a a n an a a n
a n an n g
n a n a a a an n
1 2 2 8 8 2 2 4 6 30 48
24 4 12 8 4 24
52 48 16
2 2 2 6 4
2 2 2 2 3 2 2
3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 1
= - - - - - + - - - +
- - - - - - - +
- - -
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Note that for all values of q  not satisfying condition (2), MIX A MIX A 1 2 1 1 > . This is
not just due to the fact that workers are more than rentiers (the reason why also G(2)
is greater than G(1)); it is also a consequence of the fact that A1 plays "concession"
with greater probability.
After replacing "next stage" with the above payoffs (see Table 1) we can analyse what
happens at T=0. Once again there are two NE in pure strategies, namely: {A(1), B(2)}
and {B(1), A(2)}, because:
B i MIX Ai ( ) > 1          i =  1, 2
so every player concedes, given that the opponent does not concede. Following the
same reasoning as in the second stage of the game, let us select the mixed strategies
equilibrium. We will call s the probability with which A1 plays "concession" at T=0,






















Again, A1 plays "concession" with a greater probability with respect to A2.
With some further calculus the expected payoffs characterising the mixed strategy
equilibrium at T=0 (called MIX A 2 1 and MIX A 2 2 respectively) can be found, which19
can also be thought of as the expected utilities of the players at the beginning of the
game. Their values are the following:
MIX A a an n a an n a n an
n a a n an a n an n g
n a an n a an n a a n an a n
an n
2 1 6 24 24 7 20 12 8 32
32 3 12 24 12 48 48
2 2 8 8 4 4 4 8 4
16 16
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 4 2 2 1
= - - - + + + - - +
- - + + - - -
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MIX A a n an a an n a a n an
n a a a n an a a n
a n an n g a n a an n a an
n a a a n an
2 2 6 24 24 4 12 8 40 64
32 3 12 36 24 12 72
156 144 48 2 2 8 8 4
4 4 12 8 4
2 2 2 2 3 2 2
3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
= - - - - + + - - - +
- - - - - - -
- - - + + + - - +
+ + + + +
(
) ( ( )(
g g g qg qg qg
qg g qg qg qg q g q g
q g q g q g g g
g g qg qg qg a a n a n
an n
4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 4 2 2 1
24 52
48 16
q g q g q g




where MIX A MIX A 2 2 2 1 > , as expected.
Let us finally consider what happens to public debt and inflation in this context, and the
implications as far as welfare is concerned.
The first thing to point out is that the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game implies
the possibility of a delay in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes and a contemporary
rise in debt and inflation. This possibility is present only if the mixed strategies
equilibrium is selected. In fact, it can easily be shown that if at stage two either of the
pure strategies equilibria ({D(1), E(2)} or {E(1), D(2)}) were singled out, the
equilibrium at stage one would be in pure strategies, too ({A(1), B(2)} in the first case,
{B(1), A(2)} in the second). This means there would be a winner and a loser at T=0,
thus making the use of debt and inflation unnecessary. But we have motivated why the
mixed strategies equilibrium is to be considered as the best candidate for selection in20
this context of multiple equilibria. What happens here is best described by the story of
the two players both playing "concession" and "no concession" with some probability.
The second point we want to emphasise is that in the mixed strategies equilibrium rises
in debt and inflation are only possible, not certain as in the game described in the
previous paragraph. In fact, either or both players may concede at T=0. Moreover,
even when the game reaches the second stage because both players have not conceded
at T=0, there may be uni- or bilateral concession then
15. Therefore there may be delays
in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes of different duration: the rise of debt and
inflation may be interrupted before the end of the mandate, or there may be no
stabilisation before T=2. This final option is peculiar of coalition governments only, as
it is excluded if B2 is elected.
As far as welfare is concerned, it is interesting to notice that the condition on q
characterising this set-up takes the form of a lower bound. This means that the
sensitivity to the distortions seignorage brings about may now be great. All outcomes
of the game save for those implying immediate concession are therefore bound to
cause a great deal of inefficiency (the greater the longer the delay in adopting non-
distortionary taxes).
In terms of payoffs, however, it is interesting to notice that a greater q  does not
necessarily mean a smaller expected utility. This is because an increase in the sensitivity
to the distortions caused by inflation affects the probabilities of playing "concession" at
both stages.
To see the point, consider for simplicity the special case of perfect symmetry (a=0)
16.
First of all, consider that a small increase in q  increases the probability with which









                                                       
15 It is interesting to notice that unlike in Alesina and Drazen (1991) concession by either side (or
both) does not mean giving up being part of the government. Declaring to be ready to be burdened
with the whole of the fiscal deficit while remaining part of the ruling coalition is not an incoherent
behaviour, because the coalition parties are strongly ideologically motivated.
16 Introducing asymmetry between the players does not make any difference from a qualitative point of
view.21
This is because not conceding is now more costly. Notice the above derivative is
decreasing in q .
The next step is to look at the effect on MIX Ai 1 . This payoff may be thought of as a
weighted average of the payoffs associated with the four possible outcomes of the
game at T=1, where the weights depend on the value of p. There are therefore two
effects of a small increase of q  on MIX Ai 1 : one is indirect, as it affects it via p, and
is positive; one is direct, as it concerns the values of the payoffs MIX Ai 1  is a weighted
average of, and is negative. As the derivative of p in q  is decreasing, the smaller the
starting value of q , the greater the indirect effect, which can then prevail over the
direct effect. So for small starting values of q  a small increase in this parameter makes
MIX Ai 1  increase, while the contrary is true when the starting value of q  is sufficiently
high
17.
Consider now that an increase in MIX Ai 1  makes the probability with which both
players play "concession" at T=0, z, smaller. This is also intuitively clear, because
MIX Ai 1  is the payoff associated with the outcome "no concession, no concession" at
T=0 and if its value is not so small, the probability with which both players concede at
that time is not so great.
We then finally come to the effect of a small increase in q  on MIX Ai 2 . This payoff is
a weighted average of A(i), B(i), C(i) and MIX Ai 1 , the four weights depending on the
value of z. Again, there are two antagonist effects: q  enters the MIX Ai 2  function via
MIX Ai 1  and via z, and when an increase in q  makes the former greater (which is the
case when the starting value for that parameter is small), it makes the latter smaller,
and vice versa. It is the effect working through z that turns out to be the dominant one
here. The conclusion is that when the starting value of q  is small, a small increase
makes the value of MIX Ai 2  decrease, but if the starting value for q  is sufficiently
high its increase determines an increase in MIX Ai 2 .
8. An equilibrium implying the possibility of growth of debt and inflation in both
years of the mandate.
If the RHS of condition (1) is smaller than the RHS of condition (4), the ranges of
values for q  considered in the previous paragraphs are the only ones associated with22
equilibria of the game between the coalition members implying the possibility of a
delay in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes
18.
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the game has an equilibrium which implies the possibility of the introduction of
maximum inefficiency in the economy.
 Consider in fact that condition (1) is met, so that if the second stage of the game is
reached, both players find it convenient not to concede, given that the opponent plays
"no concession". {G(1), G(2)}, the expected payoffs of the equilibrium at T=1, are
then inserted in the first stage of the game, just like in par. 6. Here, however, q  is not
so small as to have both A1 and A2 play "no concession" at T=0, given that the
opponent does not concede. On the contrary, since condition (4) is not met, both
players choose to concede, given that the opponent does not concede. There are
                                                                                                                                                              
17 All derivatives we mention without showing are available upon request.
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the game has subgame perfect equilibria always implying A2's unilateral concession at T=0. This has
to do with the fact that workers are more numerous than rentiers (a > 0), so that the individual fiscal
burden in case of unilateral concession, to be compared to the one associated to the outcome "no
concession, no concession", is always smaller for workers than for rentiers.23
therefore at least two NE at T=0: {A(1), B(2)} and {B(1), A(2)}. Both of these are in
pure strategies, and just like in par. 7 a third equilibrium, the mixed strategies one, is to
be selected as the "focal point".
Let us therefore analyse the mixed strategies equilibrium of this game. The values of



































































Note that if a were equal to 0
19, ~ ~ s z = , but since a > 0, ~ ~ s z >  (the equilibrium is not
symmetric, but just less asymmetric than the pure strategies ones).
Given the values for ~ s  and ~ z , the expected payoffs of A1 and A2 at T=0, called EPA1
and EPA2, are easily found:
EPA
a n a an n a an n
n a an n
g 1
4 8 9 18 36 2 3 2 6 2 12 2 2
2 3 2 4 2 =
+ - + + + - -
- - -
g qg qg g qg qg
g g q q ( )( )
EPA
a n a a an n a a an n
a n a a an n
g 2
4 8 9 18 2 54 36 2 3 2 6 2 2 18 2 12 2 2
2 3 2 2 6 4 2 =
+ + + + + - - - -
- + + + +
g qg qg qg g qg qg qg
g g q q q ( )( )( )
Note that EPA EPA 2 1 >  if, as by assumption, a > 0 (EPA EPA 2 1 =  if a = 0).
                                                       
19 If a=0, the RHS of condition (4) is obviously smaller than the RHS of condition (1), because
condition (1) is the same as condition (2), condition (4) is the same as condition (3) and we know (3)
is more stringent than (1). In this context there are only three ranges of values for q  determining for
the game different equilibria. These equilibria are those described in par. 6, par. 7 and here; all of
them imply the possibility of a delay in stabilisation.24
What does all this imply from the point of view of the dynamics of public debt and
inflation? How much inefficiency does a coalition government introduce in such a
context? Let us now answer these questions.
The peculiar aspect of this mixed strategies equilibrium is that if the second stage of
the game is reached, both players play pure strategies ("no concession"). So depending
on the actions taken by the players at T=0, either there is immediate adoption of non-
distortionary taxes to cover public spending (immediate uni- or bilateral concession),
or the government recurs to debt and inflation, in which case a stabilisation is excluded
before T=2, i.e. the time of the enforcement of the international agreement. Public debt
may or may not rise during the mandate; if it does, it rises for the whole length of it
and is transmitted to the next government. When this is the case, inefficiency is
introduced because debt is always matched by inflation, and inflation determines a
reduction in expected utility because of its distortionary effects. The greater q , the
greater this reduction. The value for this parameter is here intermediate with respect to
the ranges considered in par. 6 and par. 7.
It is however interesting to notice that the value of q  also influences the probabilities
with which the coalition members play "concession" at T=0. A small increase makes
these probabilities greater, as it is possible to infer from the positive sign of their partial
derivatives in q :
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This is the reason why the values of EPA1 and EPA2 also increase as a consequence
of a small increase in q , as shows the positive sign of their partial derivatives:
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In fact, the game is now more likely to end with uni- or bilateral concession, and this
makes expected utility increase, as delays in stabilisation are costly. It is true that if "no
concession, no concession" is the outcome at T=0, the expected utility is smaller as a
consequence of an increase in q , but the first, positive effect always prevails here.
9. The political equilibrium.
Let us now consider the political equilibrium. There are two questions to address:
a) whether it is true that the possible winners of an election may only be B2 and
A1+A2, and the crucial role of unattached workers' electoral choice;
b) how strong their bias for the conservative ideology must be to get them to vote for
A2, in spite of the fact that they can anticipate that this will lead to a coalition
government that cannot implement their favourite fiscal policy and may introduce debt
and inflation, thus causing a reduction of their own and overall welfare.
To answer these questions it is convenient to make a numerical example satisfying the
assumptions set about the political context:
example:       n = 10
                      a = 105
                      IC of left-wing workers: 54
                      IC of conservative workers: 8
                      IC of conservative rentiers: 3
                      IC of left-wing rentiers: 2
                      unattached rentiers: 5
                      unattached workers: 53
                      (2n+a+1)/2 = 63
a) Only unattached voters' votes are on the market, and which direction they go
depends crucially on the realisation of q at T=0, which is common knowledge.
Depending on that realisation, unattached workers will either choose to vote for A2 or26
for B2, the two workers' parties with opposed ideological tendencies, according to a
criterion we will consider in b). Still depending on the realisation for q at T=0, but
following their own criterion, unattached rentiers will vote for either A1 or B1, if it
exists
20.
If unattached workers vote for B2, B2 gains an absolute majority (in the example, 107
votes at least) and there will be a single party, left-wing government. If unattached
workers vote for A2, no party will gain absolute majority. A2 and B2 are made up of
agents with lexicographic preferences with opposed ideologies at the top of the
ranking, and will therefore refuse to form a coalition between each other. A1 and A2
will get together instead so as to form a conservative majority (64 > 63 in the
example).
Notice the assumptions made about the relative numerosity of the various social
groups and typologies of voters are such that all depends on unattached workers'
choice. In fact, one can easily see that unattached rentiers' votes are always irrelevant
for the elections' result
21. Unattached workers know q0 and consequently they can
work out which party unattached rentiers will find it convenient to vote for. But this
information is of no use, since there is no strategic interaction between the two groups
and unattached workers can cast their vote without any consideration of unattached
rentiers' move, knowing it is their choice that counts. Also unattached rentiers can
calculate unattached workers' convenience, but their knowledge of unattached
workers' choice is useless because their electoral choice is irrelevant, anyway.
We can therefore concentrate on unattached workers' criterion in making their
electoral choice, as this is all the electoral result depends upon.
b) In order to choose whom to vote for, unattached workers make a comparison
between their expected utilities in case of a victory of B2 and the formation of a
                                                       
20 If B1 does not exist, but q0 is very high, unattached rentiers might choose B2.
21 It might seem that in the example this is a consequence of the fact unattached rentiers are much less
than unattached workers, which is due to fact that a is much greater than n. However, it is not always
so. The assumptions about the political context may be satisfied even if n > a, in which case the
number of unattached rentiers is just a little smaller than the number of unattached workers (the
difference between the two can be unity).27
conservative coalition
22. The option that guarantees them the greater utility will
obviously be their choice. Of course, unattached workers can anticipate the game that
will be played between A1 and A2 if they vote for A2. They will therefore vote for A2
only if the benefit coming from having their ideology in power is greater than the
smaller expected value of the non-ideological component of their utility function
associated with the fiscal policy that will be implemented by the conservative coalition.
A choice for B2 would actually mean that all production costs of the public good
during the mandate would be paid by rentiers, while it is not so when A1+A2 is in
office, no matter the way the game is played (that is, no matter the value of q ). In fact,
in this case unattached workers' expected consumption and eventual disruption due to
the presence of inflation are the same as A2's payoff at T=0.
The condition for a victory for the A1+A2 coalition is therefore a condition on the
minimum value which q0, representing how much agents care for ideology at T=0, can
take up. This condition varies according to how the game between the coalition
partners is expected to be played, which is in turn dependent on the value of q . We
will consider the three possible cases in the next paragraph.
10. The minimum value for the ideological bias allowing a victory for the
conservative coalition.
We have already anticipated that the elections' result depends on the unattached
workers' choice, and that this is made comparing their expected utility associated with
a victory of B2 with that associated with a victory of A1+A2. Let us make the same
comparison, supposing that the conservative coalition wins the elections at T=2
23. The
                                                       
22 Unattached workers only have to consider their expected utilities in the first three years to come,
because three years is the maximum length of the effect of any fiscal policy implemented within the
term, given the assumption about the stabilisation at T=2.
23 Both these expected utilities actually depend also on the elections' result at T=2: in fact, the fiscal
policy implemented in the third year is totally predetermined, but as far as the ideological component
of the utility function is concerned one must anticipate who wins the elections at T=2 in order to know
if it is 0 (B2's victory) or not. The electoral competition at T=2 is only centred on ideology, and the
elections' result does not depend on what fiscal policy has been implemented in the previous mandate,
but just on q2. At T=0 all voters can do to predict the value of the ideological bias at T=2 is to
remember that q is a random walk, so that:
E q q ( ) 2 0 =28
expected utility of unattached workers for the next three years if B2 wins the elections









that is, payoff A(2) augmented with the ideological component referred to t=3. In fact,
when in office B2 finances public spending by taxing rentiers only, just like A2 when
he is the only winner of the game at T=0.
Notice however that we cannot exclude the possibility that B2 uses public debt at T=0,
while in the game between the coalition partners we have implicitly assumed that debt
is used only when "no concession, no concession" is the outcome. If B2 issues debt for
the 1-g  proportion of public spending at T=0, the remaining part is covered by a non-
distortionary tax on rentiers. However, debt is never renewed at T=1, as this would
imply transmission of debt to the time of the enforcement of the international
agreement, when both social groups are called to contribute to the fiscal stabilisation.
B2 therefore finds it convenient to stabilise at T=1 by raising the tax on rentiers so high
as to finance both the public spending of that year and the repayment of debt. In terms
of workers' expected utility this behaviour on B2's part is equivalent to running no
deficit in any year of the mandate, because debt is not matched by inflation here
24. This
aspect of the model is interesting in that it denies that only coalition governments of
the ideological kind are debt-prone. What is distinctive of those governments' rules are
only a higher probability of rising inflation and of prolonged delays in stabilising.
                                                                                                                                                              
Therefore, if q0 0 >  the conservative coalition is expected to win the elections at T=2 (because all
unattached voters will vote for them), while if q0 0 <  B2 is the expected winner at T=2, and so the
expected utility referred to t=3 will not have an ideological component. However, one could also do
without all these predictions. In fact, unattached workers' aim is to see whether their expected payoff
in case of a victory for the conservative coalition at T=0 is greater than the one associated to B2's
victory and these payoffs both have or have not an extra q0, depending on the predictions on the
elections' result at T=2: their comparison is therefore not affected by that.
24 There is also equivalence is in terms of general welfare. In fact, thanks to the peculiar shape of the
utility function and the fact that the rate of interest is equal to the rate of discount, rentiers are
indifferent between the option of paying the same amount of taxes at T=0 and at T=1 and that of
paying little today and more tomorrow. This emphasises the fact that in this model a rising public
debt is not welfare-reducing in itself, but only when matched by inflation, because of its distortionary
effects.29
As for unattached workers' expected utility if the A1+A2 coalition is elected, it all
depends on how the game between the coalition partners is expected to be played,

























( ) ( )
that is, G(2) augmented with the ideological component now referred to all the three
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unattached workers' expected utility if the conservative coalition wins the elections at
T=0 is:
EPA q 2 3 0 +
By setting unattached workers' expected utility if B2 gets the majority of votes at T=0
equal to their expected utility if A1+A2 wins the elections and solving for q, we get
the value of the bias for the conservative ideology given which unattached workers are
indifferent between the two political perspectives. A greater value will lead them to
vote for the conservative coalition, a smaller one for B2.30
Let us consider the case in which condition (3) holds and let us call  $ q the value for q



























Note first of all that  $ q > 0. A value of the bias in favour of the conservative ideology
that is positive but smaller than  $ q will make unattached workers vote for B2. B2 can
therefore be the winner of the elections even if the ideological atmosphere of the
moment is conservative, provided it is only moderately so. In fact, when 0 0 < < q q $
unattached workers find that by voting B2, the party that makes things most
favourable to them from a fiscal point of view, the benefit in terms of greater expected
consumption is greater than the cost in terms of lack of representation in power of
their ideological view. If q q 0 > $, instead, unattached workers will vote for A2 in spite
of the smaller value of the non-ideological component of the utility function that this
choice will entail, because they now care for their ideology more.
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The fact that all three partial derivatives are positive is intuitively clear: the greater the
value of public expenditure to finance every year, or the proportion of the deficit
financed through seignorage, or the sensitivity to the distortions caused by inflation,
ceteris paribus, the greater the reduction in the value of the non-ideological component31
of the utility function when an ideological coalition is in office. The greater this
inefficiency, the stronger the bias for the ideology the coalition represents must be in
order for voters to choose it, anyway.
Consider now a context where q  is such that condition (2) does not hold. If we call q
the value for q making unattached workers indifferent between B2 and the
conservative coalition, it is easy to see that this value is:
q MIX A
n a













Again, this value is positive. It is interesting to have a little bit of comparative statics
here, too. The sign of the partial derivative in g is again positive
25, but those in q  and
g  depend on the starting value for the parameter in question. This is due to the fact
that the values for both these parameters affect the way the game between the coalition
partners is played, and particularly the probability with which they play "concession" at
each stage of the game.
We have already seen in par. 7 that this is true for q , and how a small increase in this
parameter determines an increase or decrease in MIX A 2 2 depending on whether the
starting value for the parameter is high or small respectively. The partial derivative of
q in q  is simply the partial derivative of MIX A 2 2 in the same parameter with the
opposite sign, so a small increase in q , starting from a modest value, will make q
increase, while a small increase in q , starting from a high value, will make q decrease.
This second case is counterintuitive, but it has to do with the fact that when both
players concede with greater probability at both stages of the game the inefficiency a
coalition government is expected to introduce is smaller. The smaller the inefficiency
expected, the smaller the minimum bias for the conservative ideology that makes it
convenient for unattached workers to vote for the coalition. It can be shown that the
way a small increase in g  affects MIX A 2 2, and hence q, is totally similar.
Finally to the third context in which an ideological coalition is likely to determine
delays in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes to cover public spending, the one
analysed in par. 8. Here the critical value for q will be called ~ q:
                                                       






































In fact, we already know the partial derivative of EPA2 in q  is always positive, and
the one in g  can be shown to be positive, too. So the counterintuitive result seen in the
context where condition (2) does not hold shows up again here, and for all values of
the parameters.
We conclude by saying that all the three contexts we have analysed confirm what may
be seen as one of the core messages of the model: although rational agents can
anticipate their electoral choice will lead to the formation of a coalition government
whose policy is not the most favourable one for them in terms of allocation of the fiscal
burden, and who is likely to bring about inefficiency through the introduction of
inflation, such a government can still be elected in office. This happens when agents'
attachment to the ideology the coalition represents is strong enough.
11. Conclusions.
By identifying the strategic interaction between coalition partners with a game of
complete information, the Bank Runs game, we have succeeded in creating a model in
which the basic problem with coalition governments identifies with the fact that its
members' commitments to each other are not binding. By creating a political context
around the game we have pointed out that the true determinant of prolonged periods
of rising debt and inflation is a high degree of polarisation of the electorate on some33
extra-economic issue (when matched by a polarisation on the attribution of the fiscal
burden that is not coincident with it). These are our main  achievements.
Form a theoretical point of view, the weak point of the model presented here is on the
other hand the crucial role played by the assumption about the existence of an end of
the game at a given point in time. This assumption may however be seen as a sort of
loose translation of a no-Ponzi-game condition. Another aspect of the model that
could be improved is the treatment of monetary policy, which is here simply considered
as a branch of fiscal policy. The introduction of saving and the consideration of the
possibility for coalition governments to choose the value of public expenditure seem
instead almost impossible tasks in this set-up, which is already complicated by the
dynamics of debt and seignorage.
As for the translation of the message of our model for empirical purposes, there are
many new elements. First of all, it would be interesting to consider the presence of
ideological polarisation in different countries throughout time in relation to the fiscal
policies implemented
26. Secondly, if the empirical work is to be about coalition
governments, we put a strong emphasis on the fact that only ideological coalitions are
likely to introduce inefficiencies; one must distinguish between coalitions according to
the nature of the common purposes that keep it together. Thirdly, our model does not
affirm that single party governments or non-ideological coalitions never use public
debt; it only says ideological coalitions are more likely to cause prolonged delays in
stabilisation. Finally, our model denies that coalition governments are unable to
stabilise. Making reference to Alesina and Drazen and identifying unilateral concession
with the end of a coalition government, some authors (Alesina and Perotti (1994))
have stated that stabilisations can only be performed by single party governments.
Since the coalitions likely to cause large accumulations of debt are ideological
coalitions, concession does not necessarily mean retirement from the government: the
loser has still to carry on with the task to represent an ideological view. We can only
say that when an ideological coalition is in office, the stabilisation is likely to happen
later in time, hence to be stronger.
                                                       
26 However, it must be said that if we suppose the sensitivity to the distortions caused by inflation are
high, not necessarily the countries with the highest degree of ideological polarisation are the most
likely to run deficits for long periods of time, as we have seen analysing the mixed strategies
equilibria.34Table 1.
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